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Abstract
A recent line of work focused on making adversarial training computationally efficient for
deep learning models. In particular, Wong et al. [46] showed that `∞-adversarial training with
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) can fail due to a phenomenon called catastrophic overfitting,
when the model quickly loses its robustness over a single epoch of training. We show that adding
a random step to FGSM, as proposed in [46], does not prevent catastrophic overfitting, and that
randomness is not important per se — its main role being simply to reduce the magnitude of
the perturbation. Moreover, we show that catastrophic overfitting is not inherent to deep and
overparametrized networks, but can occur in a single-layer convolutional network with a few filters.
In an extreme case, even a single filter can make the network highly non-linear locally, which is the
main reason why FGSM training fails. Based on this observation, we propose a new regularization
method, GradAlign, that prevents catastrophic overfitting by explicitly maximizing the gradient
alignment inside the perturbation set and improves the quality of the FGSM solution. As a
result, GradAlign allows to successfully apply FGSM training also for larger `∞-perturbations
and reduce the gap to multi-step adversarial training. The code of our experiments is available
at https://github.com/tml-epfl/understanding-fast-adv-training.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models based on empirical risk minimization are known to be often non-robust
to small worst-case perturbations. For decades, this has been the topic of active research by the
statistics, optimization and machine learning communities [19, 2, 10, 3]. However, the recent success
of deep learning [22, 33] has raised the interest in this topic. The lack of robustness in deep learning
is clearly illustrated by the existence of adversarial examples, i.e. tiny input perturbations that can
easily fool state-of-the-art deep neural networks into making wrong predictions [38, 12].
The benefits of adversarially robust models extend beyond security considerations [3] to model
interpretability [41, 32] and generalization [50, 47, 4]. In order to improve the robustness, two
families of solutions have been developed: adversarial training (AT) that amounts to training the
model on adversarial examples [12, 23] and provable defenses that derive and optimize robustness
certificates [45, 29, 7]. Currently, adversarial-training based methods appear to be preferred by
practitioners since they (a) achieve higher empirical robustness (although without providing a
robustness certificate), (b) are scalable to state-of-the-art deep networks, and (c) work equally well
for different threat models. Adversarial training can be formulated as a robust optimization problem
[35, 23] which takes the form of a non-convex non-concave min-max problem. However, computing
the optimal adversarial examples is an NP-hard problem [21, 44]. Thus adversarial training can only
rely on approximate methods to solve the inner maximization problem.
One popular approximation method successfully used in adversarial training is the PGD attack
[23] where multiple steps of projected gradient descent are performed. It is now widely believed
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Figure 1: Robustness of different adversarial training (AT) methods on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18 trained
and evaluated with different l∞-radii. The results are averaged over 5 random seeds used for training and
reported with the standard deviation. FGSM AT: standard FGSM AT, FGSM-RS AT: FGSM AT with a
random step [46], FGSM AT + GradAlign: FGSM AT combined with our proposed regularizer GradAlign,
AT for Free: recently proposed method for fast PGD AT [34], PGD-2/PGD-10 AT: AT with a 2-/10-step
PGD-attack. Our proposed regularizer GradAlign prevents catastrophic overfitting in FGSM training and
leads to significantly better results which are close to the computationally demanding PGD-10 AT.
that models adversarially trained via the PGD attack [23, 49] are robust since small adversarially
trained networks can be formally verified [5, 39, 46], and larger models could not be broken on public
challenges [23, 49]. Recently, [8] evaluated the majority of recently published defenses to conclude
that the standard `∞ PGD training achieves the best empirical robustness; a result which can
only be improved using semi-supervised approaches [18, 1, 6]. In contrast, other empirical defenses
that were claiming improvements over standard PGD training had overestimated the robustness
of their reported models [8]. These experiments imply that adversarial training in general is the
key algorithm for robust deep learning, and thus that performing it efficiently is of paramount
importance.
Another approximation method for adversarial training is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[12] which is based on the linear approximation of the neural network loss function. However, the
literature is still ambiguous about the performance of FGSM training, i.e. it remains unclear whether
FGSM training can consistently lead to robust models. For example, [23] and [40] claim that FGSM
training works only for small `∞-perturbations, while [46] suggest that FGSM training can lead to
robust models for arbitrary `∞-perturbations if one adds uniformly random initialization before the
FGSM step. Related to this, [46] further identified a phenomenon called catastrophic overfitting
where FGSM training first leads to some robustness at the beginning of training, but then suddenly
becomes non-robust within a single training epoch. However, the reasons for such a failure remain
unknown. This motivates us to consider the following question as the main theme of the paper:
When and why does fast adversarial training with FGSM lead to robust models?
Contributions. We first show that not only FGSM training is prone to catastrophic overfitting,
but the recently proposed fast adversarial training methods [34, 46] as well (see Fig. 1). We then
analyze the reasons why using a random step in FGSM [46] helps to slightly mitigate catastrophic
overfitting and show it simply boils down to reducing the average magnitude of the perturbations.
Then we discuss the connection behind catastrophic overfitting and local linearity in deep networks
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and in single-layer convolutional networks where we show that even a single filter can make the
network non-linear locally, and causes the failure of FGSM training. We additionally provide for this
case a theoretical explanation which helps to explain why FGSM AT is successful at the beginning
of the training. Finally, we propose a regularization method, GradAlign, that prevents catastrophic
overfitting by explicitly maximizing the gradient alignment inside the perturbation set and therefore
improves the quality of the FGSM solution. We compare GradAlign to other adversarial training
schemes in Fig. 1 and point out that among all fast adversarial training methods considered only
FGSM+GradAlign does not suffer from catastrophic overfitting and leads to high robustness even
for large `∞-perturbations.
2 Problem overview and related work
Let `(x, y; θ) denote the loss of a ReLU-network parametrized by θ ∈ Rm on the example (x, y) ∼ D
where D is the data generating distribution.1 Previous works [35, 23] formalized the goal of training
adversarially robust models as the following robust optimization problem:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈∆
`(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
. (1)
We focus here on the `∞ threat model, i.e. ∆ = {δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ε}, where the adversary can
change each input coordinate xi by at most ε. Unlike classical stochastic saddle point problems of
the form minθ maxδ E[`(θ, δ)] [20], the inner maximization problem here is inside the expectation.
Therefore the solution of each subproblem maxδ∈∆ `(x+ δ, y; θ) depends on the particular example
(x, y) and standard algorithms such as gradient descent-ascent which alternate gradient descent in θ
and gradient ascent in δ cannot be used. Instead each of these non-concave maximization problems
has to be solved independently. Thus, an inherent trade-off appears between computationally efficient
approaches which aim at solving this inner problem in as few iterations as possible and approaches
which aim at solving the problem more accurately but with more iterations. In an extreme case,
the PGD attack [23] uses multiple steps of projected gradient ascent (PGD), which is accurate
but computationally expensive. At the other end of the spectrum, Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [12] performs only one iteration of gradient ascent with respect to the `∞-norm:
δFGSM
def
= ε sign(∇x `(x, y; θ)), (2)
followed by a projection of x+ δFGSM onto the [0, 1]d to ensure it is a valid input.2 This leads to a
fast algorithm which, however, does not always lead to robust models as observed in [23, 40]. A closer
look at the evolution of the robustness during FGSM AT reveals that using FGSM can lead to a
model with some degree of robustness but only until a point where the robustness suddenly drops.
This phenomenon is called catastrophic overfitting in [46]. As a partial solution, the training can be
stopped just before that point which leads to non-trivial but suboptimal robustness as illustrated in
Fig. 1. [46] further notice that initializing FGSM from a random starting point η ∼ U([−ε, ε]d), i.e.:
δFGSM−RS
def
= Π[−ε,ε]d [η + α sign(∇x `(x+ η, y; θ))], (3)
1In practice we use training samples with random data augmentation.
2Throughout the paper we will focus on image classification, i.e. inputs x will be images.
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helps to mitigate catastrophic overfitting and leads to better robustness for the considered ε values
(e.g. ε = 8/255 on CIFAR-10). Along the same lines, [42] observe that using dropout on all layers
(including convolutional) also helps to stabilize FGSM AT.
An alternative solution is to interpolate between FGSM and PGD AT. For example, [43] suggest
to first use FGSM AT, and later to switch to multi-step PGD AT which is motivated by their analysis
suggesting that the inner maximization problem has to be solved more accurately at the end of
training. [34] propose to run PGD with step size α = ε and simultaneously update the weights of the
network. On a related note, [48] collect the weight updates during PGD, but apply them after PGD
is completed. Additionally, [48] update the gradients of the first layer multiple times. However, none
of these approaches are conclusive, either leading to comparable robustness to FGSM-RS training
[46] and still failing for higher `∞-radii (see Fig. 1 for [34] and [46]) or being in the worst case as
expensive as multi-step PGD AT [43]. We focus next on analyzing the FGSM-RS training [46] as the
other recent variations of fast adversarial training [34, 48, 42] lead to models with similar robustness.
Experimental setup. Unless mentioned otherwise, we perform training on PreAct ResNet-
18 [16] with the cyclic learning rates [37] and half-precision training [24] following the setup of
[46]. We evaluate adversarial robustness using the PGD-50-10 attack, i.e. with 50 iterations and 10
restarts with step size α = ε/4. More experimental details are specified in Appendix B.
3 The role and limitations of using random initialization in
FGSM training
First, we show that FGSM with a random step fails to resolve catastrophic overfitting for larger ε.
Then we provide evidence against the explanation given by [46] on the benefit of randomness for
FGSM AT, and propose a new explanation based on the linear approximation quality of FGSM.
FGSM with random step does not resolve catastrophic overfitting. Crucially, [46]
observed that adding an initial random step to FGSM as in Eq. (3) helps to avoid catastrophic
overfitting. However, this holds only if the step size is not too large (as illustrated in Fig. 3 of [46]
for ε = 8/255) and, more importantly, only for small enough ε as we show in Fig. 1. Indeed, using
the step size recommended by [46] extends the working regime of FGSM but only from ε = 6/255
to ε = 9/255, with 0% adversarial accuracy for ε = 10/255. When early stopping is applied (Fig. 1,
right), there is still a significant gap compared to PGD-10 training, particularly for large `∞-radii.
For example, for ε = 16/255, FGSM-RS AT leads to 22.24% PGD-50-10 accuracy while PGD-10 AT
obtains a much better accuracy of 30.65%.
Previous explanation: randomness diversifies the threat model. A hypothesis stated
in [46] was that FGSM-RS helps to avoid catastrophic overfitting by diversifying the threat model.
Indeed, the random step allows to have perturbations not only at the corners {−ε, ε}d like the
FGSM-attack3, but rather in the whole `∞-ball, [−ε, ε]d. Here we refute this hypothesis by modifying
the usual PGD training by projecting onto {−ε, ε}d the perturbation obtained via the PGD attack.
We perform experiments on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18 with `∞-perturbations of radius ε = 8/255
over 5 random seeds. FGSM AT leads to catastrophic overfitting achieving 0.00± 0.00% adversarial
accuracy if early stopping is not applied, while the standard PGD-10 AT and our modified PGD-10
AT schemes achieve 50.48± 0.20% and 50.64± 0.23% adversarial accuracy respectively. Thereby
similar robustness as the original PGD AT can still be achieved without training on pertubations
3For simplicity, we ignore the projection of x+ δ onto [0, 1]d in this section.
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from the interior of the `∞-ball. We conclude that diversity of adversarial examples is not crucial
here. What makes the difference is rather having an iterative instead of a single-step procedure to
find a corner of the `∞-ball that sufficiently maximizes the loss.
New explanation: a random step improves the linear approximation quality. Using
a random step in FGSM is guaranteed to decrease the expected magnitude of the perturbation. This
simple observation is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Effect of the random step) Let η ∼ U([−ε, ε]d) be a random starting point, and
α ∈ [0, 2ε] be the step size of FGSM-RS defined in Eq. (3), then
Eη [‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖2] ≤
√
Eη
[
‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖22
]
=
√
d
√
− 1
6ε
α3 +
1
2
α2 +
1
3
ε2. (4)
The proof is deferred to Appendix A.1. We first remark that the upper bound is in the range
[1/
√
3
√
dε,
√
dε], and therefore always less or equal than ‖δFGSM‖2 =
√
dε. We visualize our bound
in Fig. 2 where the expectation is approximated by Monte-Carlo sampling over 1,000 samples of η,
and note that the bound becomes increasingly tight for high-dimensional inputs.
The key observation here is that among all possible perturbations of `∞-norm ε, perturbations
with a smaller `2-norm benefit from a better linear approximation. This statement follows from the
second-order Taylor expansion for twice differentiable functions:
f(x+ δ) ≈ f(x) + 〈∇xf(x), δ〉+
〈
δ,∇2xxf(x)δ
〉
,
i.e. a smaller value of ‖δ‖22 implies a smaller linear approximation error |f(x+δ)−f(x)−〈∇xf(x), δ〉 |.
Moreover, the same property still holds empirically for the non-differentiable ReLU networks (see
Appendix C.1). We conclude that by reducing in expectation the length of the perturbation ‖δ‖2,
the FGSM-RS approach of [46] takes advantage of a better linear approximation. This is supported
by the fact that FGSM-RS AT also leads to catastrophic overfitting if the step size α is chosen to be
too large (see Fig. 3 in [46]), thus providing no benefits over FGSM AT even when combined with
early stopping. We argue this is the main improvement over the standard FGSM AT.
Successful FGSM AT does not require randomness. If having perturbation with a too
large `2-norm is indeed the key factor in catastrophic overfitting, we can expect that just reducing the
step size of the standard FGSM should work equally well as FGSM-RS. For ε = 8/255 on CIFAR-10,
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Figure 2: Visualization of our upper bound on
Eη[‖δFGSM−RS‖2]. The dashed line corresponds to
the step size α = 1.25ε recommended in [46].
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Table 1: Robustness of FGSM AT with a reduced step size (α = 7/255) compared to the FGSM-RS AT
proposed in [46] (α = 10/255) for ε = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 for ResNet-18 trained with early stopping. The
results are averaged over 5 random seeds used for training.
Accuracy
Model FGSM AT FGSM α = 7/255 AT FGSM-RS AT
PGD-50-10 36.35± 1.74% 45.35± 0.48% 45.60± 0.19%
[46] recommend to use FGSM-RS with step size α = 1.25ε which induces a perturbation of expected
`2-norm ‖δFGSM−RS‖2 ≈ 7/255
√
d. This corresponds to using standard FGSM with a step size
α ≈ 7/255 instead of α = ε = 8/255 (see the dashed line in Fig. 2). We report the results in Table 1
and observe that simply reducing the step size of FGSM (without any randomness) leads to the
same level of robustness. We show further in Fig. 3 that when used with a smaller step size, the
robustness of standard FGSM training even without early stopping can generalize to much higher ε.
This contrasts with the previous literature [23, 40]. We conclude from these experiments that a
more direct way to improve FGSM AT and to prevent it from catastrophic overfitting is to simply
reduce the step size. Note that this still leads to suboptimal robustness compared to PGD AT (see
Fig. 1) for ε larger than the one used during training, since in this case adversarial examples can
only be generated inside the smaller `∞-ball. This motivates us to take a closer look on how and
why catastrophic overfitting occurs to be able to prevent it without reducing the FGSM step size.
4 Understanding catastrophic overfitting via gradient alignment
First, we establish a connection between catastrophic overfitting and local linearity of the model.
Then we show that catastrophic overfitting also occurs in a single-layer convolutional network, for
which we analyze local linearity both empirically and theoretically.
When can the inner maximization problem be accurately solved with FGSM? Recall
that the FGSM attack [12] is obtained as a closed-form solution of the following optimization problem:
δFGSM = arg min‖δ‖∞≤ε 〈∇x `(x, y; θ)), δ〉. Thus, the FGSM attack is guaranteed to find the optimal
adversarial perturbation if ∇x `(x, y; θ) is constant inside the `∞-ball around the input x, i.e. the
loss function is locally linear. This motivates us to study the evolution of local linearity during
FGSM training and its connection to catastrophic overfitting. With this aim, we define the following
local linearity metric of the loss function `:
E(x,y)∼D, η∼U([−ε,ε]d) [cos (∇x `(x, y; θ),∇x `(x+ η, y; θ))] , (5)
which we refer to as gradient alignment. This quantity is easily interpretable: it is equal to one for
models linear inside the `∞-ball of radius ε, and it is approximately zero when the input gradients
are nearly orthogonal to each other. Previous works also considered local linearity of deep networks
[25, 28], however rather with the goal of introducing regularization methods that improve robustness
as an alternative to adversarial training. More precisely, [25] propose to use a curvature regularization
method that uses the FGSM point, and [28] find the input point where local linearity is maximally
violated using an iterative method, leading to comparable computational cost as PGD AT. In contrast,
we analyze here gradient alignment to improve FGSM training without seeking an alternative to it.
Catastrophic overfitting in deep networks. To understand the link between catastrophic
overfitting and local linearity, we plot in Fig. 4 the adversarial accuracies and the loss values obtained
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Figure 4: Visualization of the training process of standardly trained, FGSM trained, and PGD-10 trained
ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 with ε = 8/255. All the statistics are calculated on the test set. Catastrophic
overfitting for the FGSM AT model occurs around epoch 23 and is characterized by a sudden drop in the
PGD accuracy, a gap between the FGSM and PGD losses, and a dramatic decrease of local linearity.
by FGSM and PGD AT on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18, together with the gradient alignment (see
Eq. 5) and the cosine between FGSM and PGD perturbations. We compute these statistics on
the test set. Catastrophic overfitting occurs for FGSM AT around epoch 23, and is characterized
by the following intertwined events: (a) There is a sudden drop in the PGD accuracy from 40.1%
to 0.0%, along with an abrupt jump of the FGSM accuracy from 43.5% to 86.7%. In contrast,
before the catastrophic overfitting, the ratio between the average PGD and FGSM losses never
exceeded 1.05. This suggests that FGSM cannot anymore accurately solve the inner maximization
problem. (b) Concurrently, after catastrophic overfitting, the gradient alignment of the FGSM model
drops significantly from 0.95 to 0.05 within an epoch of training, i.e. the input gradients became
nearly orthogonal inside the `∞-ball. We observe the same drop also for cos(δFGSM , δPGD) which
means that the FGSM and PGD directions are not aligned anymore (as also observed in [40]). This
echoes the observation made in [26] that SGD on the standard loss of a neural network learns models
of increasing complexity. We observe qualitatively the same phenomenon for FGSM AT, where the
complexity is captured by the degree of local non-linearity. The connection between local linearity
and catastrophic overfitting sparks interest for a further analysis in a simpler setting.
Catastrophic overfitting in a single-layer CNN. We show that catastrophic overfitting is
not inherent to deep and overparametrized networks, and can be observed in a very simple setup.
For this we train a single-layer CNN with four filters on CIFAR-10 using FGSM AT with ε = 10/255
(see Sec. B for details). We observe that catastrophic overfitting occurs in this simple model as well,
and its pattern is the same as in ResNet: a simultaneous drop of the PGD accuracy and gradient
alignment (see Appendix C.2). The advantage of considering a simple model is that we can inspect
the learned filters and understand what causes the network to become highly non-linear locally.
We observe that after catastrophic overfitting the network has learned in filter w4 a variant of the
Laplace filter (see Fig. 5), an edge-detector filter which is well-known for amplifying high-frequency
noise such as uniform noise [11]. Until the end of training, filter w4 preserves its direction (see
Appendix C.2 for detailed visualizations), but grows significantly in its magnitude together with its
outcoming weights, in contrast to the rest of the filters as shown in Fig. 5. Interestingly, if we set w4
to zero, the network largely recovers local linearity : the gradient alignment increases from 0.08 to
0.71, recovering its value before catastrophic overfitting. Thus, in this extreme case, even a single
convolutional filter can cause catastrophic overfitting. Next we analyze formally gradient alignment
in a single-layer CNN and elaborate on the connection to the noise sensitivity.
Analysis of gradient alignment in a single-layer CNN. We analyze here a single-layer
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Figure 6: Evolution of the weight norms in a single-layer CNN
before and after catastrophic overfitting (dashed line).
CNN with ReLU-activation. Let Z ∈ Rp×k be the matrix of k non-overlapping image patches
extracted from the image x = vec(Z) ∈ Rd such that zj = zj(x) ∈ Rp. The model prediction f is
parametrized by (W, b, U, c) ∈ Rp×m × Rm × Rm×k × R, and its prediction and the input gradient
are given as
f(x) =
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
uij max{〈wi, zj〉+ bi, 0}+ c, ∇xf(x) = vec
 m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
uij1〈wi,zj〉+bi≥0wie
T
j
 .
We observe that catastrophic overfitting only happens at later stages of training. At the
beginnning of the training, the gradient alignment is very high (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 11), and FGSM
solves the inner maximization problem accurately enough. Thus, an important aspect of FGSM
training is that the model starts training from highly aligned gradient. This motivates us to inspect
closely gradient alignment at initialization.
Lemma 2. (Gradient alignment at initialization) Let z ∼ U([0, 1]p) be an image patch for
p ≥ 2, η ∼ U([−ε, ε]d) a point inside the `∞-ball, the parameters of a single-layer CNN initialized
i.i.d. as w ∼ N (0, σ2wIp) for every column of W , u ∼ N (0, σ2uIm) for every column of U , b := 0,
then the gradient alignment is lower bounded by
lim
k,m→∞
cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) ≥ max
{
1−
√
2Ew,z
[
e−
1
ε2
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
]1/2
, 0.5
}
.
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Figure 7: Feature maps of filters w1 and
w4 in a single-layer CNN. A small noise
η is significantly amplified by the Laplace
filter w4 in contrast to a regular filter w1.
The lemma implies that for randomly initialized CNNs
with a large enough number of image patches k and filters
m, gradient alignment cannot be smaller than 0.5. This
is in contrast to the value of 0.12 that we observe after
catastrophic overfitting when the weights are no longer i.i.d.
We note that the lower bound of 0.5 is quite pessimistic
since it holds for an arbitrarily large ε. The lower bound
is close to 1 when ε is small compared to E ‖z‖2 which is
typical in adversarial robustness (see Appendix A.2 for the
visualization of the lower bound). High gradient alignment
at initialization also holds empirically for deep networks
as well, e.g. for ResNet-18 (see Fig. 4), starting from the
value of 0.85 in contrast to 0.04 after catastrophic overfitting.
Thus, it appears to be a general phenomenon that the standard initialization scheme of neural
network weights [15] ensures the initial success of FGSM training.
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In contrast, after some point during training, the network can learn parameters which lead to a
significant reduction of gradient alignment. For simplicity, let us consider a single-filter CNN where
the gradient alignment for a filter w and bias b at points x and x+ η has a simple expression:
cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) =
∑k
i=1 u
2
i1〈w,zi〉+b≥01〈w,zi+ηi〉+b≥0√∑k
i=1 u
2
i1〈w,zi〉+b≥0
∑k
i=1 u
2
i1〈w,zi+ηi〉+b≥0
. (6)
Considering a single-filter CNN is also motivated by the fact that in the single-layer CNN introduced
earlier, the norms of w4 and its outcoming weights are much higher than for the rest of the filters
(see Fig. 6), and thus the contribution of w4 to the predictions and gradients of the network is
the most significant. We observe that when an image x is convolved with the Laplace filter w4,
even a uniformly random noise η of small magnitude is able to significantly affect the output of
(x+ η) ∗ w4 (see Fig. 7). As a consequence, the ReLU activations of the network change their signs
which directly affects the gradient alignment in Eq. (6). Namely, x ∗ w4 + b4 has mostly negative
values, and thus many values {1〈w4,zi〉+b4}ki=1 are equal to 0. On the other hand, nearly half of
the values {1〈w4,zi+ηi〉+b4}ki=1 become 1, which significantly increases the denominator of Eq. (6),
and thus makes the cosine close to 0. At the same time, the output of a regular filter w1 shown
in Fig. 7 is only slightly affected by the random noise η. For deep networks, however, we could
not identify particular filters responsible for catastrophic overfitting, thus we consider next a more
general solution.
5 Increasing gradient alignment improves fast adversarial training
Based on the importance of gradient alignment for successful FGSM training, we propose a regularizer,
GradAlign, that aims at increasing gradient alignment and preventing catastrophic overfitting. The
core idea of GradAlign is to maximize the gradient alignment (as defined in Eq. 5) between the
gradients at point x and at a randomly perturbed point x+ η inside the `∞-ball around x:
Ω(x, y, θ)
def
= E(x,y)∼D, η∼U([−ε,ε]d) [1− cos (∇x `(x, y; θ),∇x `(x+ η, y; θ))] . (7)
Crucially, GradAlign uses gradients at points x and x + η which does not require an expensive
iterative procedure unlike, e.g., the LLR method of [28]. Note that the regularizer depends only on
the gradient direction and it is invariant to the gradient norm which contrasts it to the gradient
penalties [14, 17, 31, 36] or CURE [25] (see the comparison in Appendix D).
Experimental setup. We compare the following methods: standard FGSM AT, FGSM-RS AT
with α = 1.25ε [46], FGSM AT + GradAlign, AT for Free with m = 8 [34], PGD-2 AT with 2-step
PGD using α = ε/2, and PGD-10 AT with 10-step PGD using α = 2ε/10. We train these methods
using PreAct ResNet-18 [16] with `∞-radii ε ∈ {1/255, . . . , 16/255} on CIFAR-10 for 30 epochs and
ε ∈ {1/255, . . . , 12/255} on SVHN for 15 epochs. The only exception is AT for Free [34] which we
train for 96 epochs on CIFAR-10, and 45 epochs on SVHN which was necessary to get comparable
results to the other methods. Unlike [28] and [48], with the training scheme of [46] and α = ε/2
we could successfully train a PGD-2 model with ε = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 with robustness better
than that of their methods that use the same number of PGD steps (see Appendix D). This also
echoes the recent finding of [30] that properly tuned multi-step PGD AT outperforms more recently
published methods. As before, we evaluate robustness using PGD-50-10 with 50 iterations and 10
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Figure 8: Accuracy (dashed line) and robustness (solid line) of different adversarial training (AT) methods
on CIFAR-10 and SVHN with ResNet-18 trained and evaluated with different l∞-radii. The results are
obtained without early stopping, averaged over 5 random seeds used for training and reported with the
standard deviation.
restarts using step size α = ε/4 for the same ε that was used for training. We train each model with
5 random seeds since the final robustness can have a large variance for high ε. Also, we remark
that training with GradAlign leads on average to a 2− 3× slowdown compared to FGSM training
which is due to the use of double backpropagation (see [9] for a detailed analysis). We think that
improving the runtime of GradAlign is possible, but we postpone it to future work. Additional
implementation details are provided in Appendix B. The code of our experiments is available at
https://github.com/tml-epfl/understanding-fast-adv-training.
Results. We provide the main comparison in Fig. 8 and provide detailed numbers for specific
values of ε in Appendix D.3. First, we notice that all the methods perform almost equally well
for small enough ε, i.e. ε ≤ 6/255 on CIFAR-10 and ε ≤ 4/255 on SVHN. However, the performance
for larger ε varies a lot depending on the method due to catastrophic overfitting. Importantly,
GradAlign succesfully prevents catastrophic overfitting in FGSM AT, thus allowing to successfully
apply FGSM training also for larger `∞-perturbations and reduce the gap to PGD-10 training. In
Appendix D.4, we additionally show that FGSM + GradAlign does not suffer from catastrophic
overfitting even for ε ∈ {24/255, 32/255}. At the same time, not only FGSM AT and FGSM-RS AT
experience catastrophic overfitting, but also the recently proposed AT for Free and PGD-2, although
at higher ε values than FGSM AT. We note that GradAlign is not only applicable to FGSM AT,
but also to other methods that can also suffer from catastrophic overfitting. In particular, combining
PGD-2 with GradAlign prevents catastrophic overfitting and leads to better robustness for ε = 16/255
on CIFAR-10 (see Appendix D.3). Although performing early stopping can lead to non-trivial
robustness, standard accuracy is often significantly sacrificed which limits the usefulness of this
technique (see Appendix D). This is in contrast to training with GradAlign which leads to the same
standard accuracy as PGD-10 AT.
We also performed similar experiments on ImageNet in Appendix D.3, but observed that even for
standard FGSM training using the training schedule of [46], catastrophic overfitting does not occur
for ε ∈ {2/255, 4/255} considered in [34, 46], and thus there is no need to use GradAlign as its main
role is to prevent catastrophic overfitting. Finally, with regard to robust overfitting phenomenon
outlined in [30], we observed that training FGSM+GradAlign for more than 30 epochs also leads to
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slightly worse robustness on the test set (see Appendix D.4), thus suggesting that catastrophic and
robust overfitting are two distinct phenomena that have to be addressed separately.
6 Conclusions and outlook
We observed that catastrophic overfitting is a fundamental problem not only for standard FGSM
training, but for computationally efficient adversarial training in general. In particular, many recently
proposed schemes such as FGSM AT enhanced by a random step or AT for free are also prone
to catastrophic overfitting. Motivated by this, we explored the questions of when and why FGSM
adversarial training works, and how to improve it by increasing the gradient alignment, and thus
the quality of the solution of the inner maximization problem. Our proposed regularizer GradAlign
prevents catastrophic overfitting and improves the robustness compared to other fast adversarial
training methods reducing the gap to multi-step PGD training.
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Appendix
A Deferred proofs
In this section, we show the proofs omitted from Sec. 3 and Sec. 4.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We state again Lemma 1 from Sec. 3 and present the proof.
Lemma 1. (Effect of the random step) Let η ∼ U([−ε, ε]d) be a random starting point, and
α ∈ [0, 2ε] be the step size of FGSM-RS defined in Eq. (3), then
Eη [‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖2] ≤
√
Eη
[
‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖22
]
=
√
d
√
− 1
6ε
α3 +
1
2
α2 +
1
3
ε2.
Proof. First, note that due to the Jensen’s inequality, we can have a convenient upper bound which
is easier to work with:
E [‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖2] ≤
√
E
[
‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖22
]
. (8)
Therefore, we can focus on E
[
‖δFGSM−RS‖22
]
which can be computed analytically. Let us denote
by ∇ def= ∇x `(x+ η, y; θ) ∈ Rd, we then obtain:
Eη
[
‖δFGSM−RS‖22
]
= Eη
[∥∥Π[−ε,ε] [η + α sign(∇)]∥∥22] = d∑
i=1
Eηi
[
Π[−ε,ε] [ηi + α sign(∇i)]2
]
= dEηi
[
min{ε, |ηi + α sign(∇i)|}2
]
= dEηi
[
min{ε2, (ηi + α sign(∇i))2}
]
= dEri
[
Eηi
[
min{ε2, (ηi + α sign(∇i))2} | sign(∇i) = ri
]]
,
where in the last step we use the law of total expectation by noting that sign(∇i) is also a random
variable since it depends on ηi.
We first consider the case when sign(∇i) = 1, then the inner conditional expectation is equal to:∫ ε
−ε
min{ε2, (ηi + α)2} 1
2ε
dηi =
1
2ε
∫ ε+α
−ε+α
min{ε2, x2}dx
=
1
2ε
(∫ ε+α
ε
ε2dx+
∫ ε
−ε+α
x2dx
)
= − 1
6ε
α3 +
1
2
α2 +
1
3
ε2.
The case when sign(∇i) = −1 leads to the same expression:∫ ε
−ε
min{ε2, (ηi − α)2} 1
2ε
dηi =
1
2ε
∫ ε−α
−ε−α
min{ε2, x2}dx = − 1
6ε
α3 +
1
2
α2 +
1
3
ε2.
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Combining these two cases together with Eq. (8), we have that:
Eη [‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖2] ≤
√
E
[
‖δFGSM−RS(η)‖22
]
=
√
d
√
− 1
6ε
α3 +
1
2
α2 +
1
3
ε2.
A.2 Proof and discussion of Lemma 2
We state again Lemma 2 from Sec. 4 and present the proof.
Lemma 2. (Gradient alignment at initialization) Let z ∼ U([0, 1]p) be an image patch for
p ≥ 2, η ∼ U([−ε, ε]d) a point inside the `∞-ball, the parameters of a single-layer CNN initialized
i.i.d. as w ∼ N (0, σ2wIp) for every column of W , u ∼ N (0, σ2uIm) for every column of U , b := 0,
then the gradient alignment is lower bounded by
lim
k,m→∞
cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) ≥ max
{
1−
√
2Ew,z
[
e−
1
ε2
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
]1/2
, 0.5
}
.
Proof. For k and m large enough, the law of large number ensures that an empirical mean of i.i.d.
random variables can be approximated by its expectation with respect to random variables z, η, w, u.
This leads to
lim
k,m→∞
cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y))
= lim
k,m→∞
m∑
r=1
m∑
l=1
k∑
i=1
〈wr, wl〉uriuli1〈wr,zi〉≥01〈wl,zi+ηi〉≥0√
m∑
r=1
m∑
l=1
k∑
i=1
〈wr, wl〉uriuli1〈wr,zi〉≥01〈wl,zi〉≥0
√
m∑
r=1
m∑
l=1
k∑
i=1
〈wr, wl〉uriuli1〈wr,zi+ηi〉≥01〈wl,zi+ηi〉≥0
= lim
k,m→∞
1
km
m∑
r=1
k∑
i=1
‖wr‖22 u2ri1〈wr,zi〉≥01〈wr,zi+ηi〉≥0√
1
km
m∑
r=1
k∑
i=1
‖wr‖22 u2ri1〈wr,zi〉≥01〈wr,zi〉≥0
√
1
km
m∑
r=1
k∑
i=1
‖wr‖22 u2ri1〈wr,zi+ηi〉≥01〈wr,zi+ηi〉≥0
=
Ew,u,η,z
[
‖w‖22 u21〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
√
Ew,u,z
[
‖w‖22 u21〈w,z〉≥0
]√
Ew,u,η,z
[
‖w‖22 u21〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
=
Ew,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
√
Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0
]√
Ew,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z+η〉≥0
] . (9)
We directly compute for the denominator:
Ew,z[‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0] = Ew,η,z[‖w‖22 1〈w,z+η〉≥0] = 0.5pσ2w.
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For the numerator, by bounding Pη [〈w, η〉 ≥ 〈w, z〉] ≤ e
− 〈z,w〉2
2ε2‖w‖22 via the Hoeffding’s inequality, we
obtain
Eu,w,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
=Ew,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0Pη (〈w, z + η〉 ≥ 0)
]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0Pη (〈w, η〉 ≥ − 〈w, z〉)
]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0Pη (〈w, η〉 ≤ 〈w, z〉)
]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0 (1− Pη (〈w, η〉 ≥ 〈w, z〉))
]
≥Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0
(
1− e−
〈w,z〉2
2ε2‖w‖22
)]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0
]
− Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0 e
− 〈w,z〉2
2ε2‖w‖22
]
=0.5pσ2w − 0.5Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 e
− 〈w,z〉2
2ε2‖w‖22
]
≥0.5pσ2w − 0.5Ew
[
‖w‖42
]1/2
Ew,z
[
e
− 〈w,z〉2
ε2‖w‖22
]1/2
=0.5pσ2w − 0.5σ2w
√
p2 + 2pEw,z
[
e
− 〈w,z〉2
ε2‖w‖22
]1/2
,
where the last inequality is obtained via the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. On the other hand, we have:
Eu,w,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
=Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0Pη (〈w, η〉 ≤ 〈w, z〉)
]
≥Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥00.5
]
= 0.25pσ2w.
Now we combine both lower bounds together to establish a lower bound on Eq. (9):
Ew,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥01〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
√
Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z〉≥0
]√
Ew,z,η
[
‖w‖22 1〈w,z+η〉≥0
]
≥
max
0.5pσ2w − 0.5σ2w√p2 + 2pEw,z
[
e
− 〈w,z〉2
ε2‖w‖22
]1/2
, 0.25pσ2w

0.5pσ2w
= max
{
1−
√
1 +
2
p
Ew,z
[
e−
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
ε2
]1/2
, 0.5
}
≥max
{
1−
√
2Ew,z
[
e−
1
ε2
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
]1/2
, 0.5
}
, (10)
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where in the last step we used that p ≥ 2.
The main purpose of obtaining the lower bound in Lemma 2 was to get an expression that can
give us an insight into the key quantities which gradient alignment at initialization depends on.
Considering the limiting case k,m→∞ was necessary to obtain a ratio of expectations that allowed
us to derive a simpler expression. Finally, we lower bounded the gradient alignment from Eq. (9) using
the Hoeffding’s and Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities and used p ≥ 2 to obtain a dimension-independent
constant in front of the expectation in Eq. (10). Now we would like to provide a better understanding
about the key quantities involved in the lemma and to assess the tightness of the derived lower
bound. For this purpose, in Fig. 9 we plot:
• cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) for k = 100 patches and m = 4 filters (which resembles the
setting of the 4-filter CNN on CIFAR-10). We note that it is a random variable since it is a
function of random variables x, η,W,U .
• limk,m→∞ cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) evaluated via Eq. (9).
• Our first lower bound max
{
1− 1
pσ2w
Ew,z
[
‖w‖22 e−
1
2ε2
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
]
, 0.5
}
obtained via Hoeffding’s
inequality.
• Our final lower bound max
{
1−√2Ew,z
[
e−
1
ε2
〈w/‖w‖2,z〉2
]1/2
, 0.5
}
.
For the last three quantities we approximate the expectations by Monte-Carlo sampling by using
1,000 samples. For all the quantities we use patches of size p = 3× 3× 3 = 27 as in our CIFAR-10
experiments. We plot gradient alignment values for ε ∈ [0, 0.1] since we are interested in small
`∞-perturbations such as, e.g., ε = 8/255 ≈ 0.03 which is a typical value used for CIFAR-10 [23]. First,
we can observe that all the four quantities have very high values in [0.7, 1.0] for ε ∈ [0, 0.1] which is
in contrast to the gradient alignment value of 0.12 that we observe after catastrophic overfitting for
ε = 10/255 ≈ 0.04. Next, we observe that cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y)) has some noticeable variance
for the chosen parameters k = 100 patches and m = 4 filters. However, this variance is significantly
reduced when we increase the parameters k and m, especially when considering the limiting case
k,m→∞. Finally, we observe that both lower bounds on limk,m→∞ cos (∇x `(x, y),∇x `(x+ η, y))
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Figure 9: Visualization of the key quantities involved in Lemma 2.
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that we derived are empirically tight enough to properly capture the behaviour of gradient alignment
for small ε. However, we choose to report the last one in the lemma since it is slightly more concise
than the one obtained via Hoeffding’s inequality.
B Experimental details
We list detailed evaluation and training details below.
Evaluation. Throughout the paper, we use PGD-50-10 for evaluation of adversarial accuracy
which stands for the PGD attack with 50 iterations and 10 random restarts following [46]. We use the
step size α = ε/4. The choice of this attack is motivated by the fact that in both public benchmarks of
[23] on MNIST and CIFAR-10, the adversarial accuracy of PGD-100-50 and PGD-20-10 respectively
is only 2% away from the best entries.
Although we train our models using half precision [24], we always perform robustness evaluation
using single precision since evaluation with half precision can sometimes overestimate the robustness
of the model due to limited numerical precision in the calculation of the gradients.
We perform evaluation of standard accuracy using full test sets, but we evaluate adversarial
accuracy using 1,000 random points on each dataset.
Training details for ResNet-18. We use the implementation code of [46] with the only
difference that we do not use image normalization and gradient clipping on CIFAR-10 and SVHN
since we found that they have no significant influence on the final results. We use cyclic learning
rates and half-precision training following [46]. We do not use random initialization for PGD during
adversarial training as we did not find that it leads to any improvements on the considered datasets
(see the justifications in Sec. D.1 below). We perform early stopping based on the PGD accuracy
on the training set following [46]. We observed that such a simple model selection scheme can
successfully select a model before catastrophic overfitting that has non-trivial robustness.
On CIFAR-10, we train all the models for 30 epochs with the maximum learning rate 0.3 except
AT for free [34] which we train for 96 epochs with the maximum learning rate 0.04 using m = 8
minibatch replays to get comparable results to the other methods.
On SVHN, we train all the models for 15 epochs with the maximum learning rate 0.05 except
AT for free [34] which we train for 45 epochs with the maximum learning rate 0.01 using m = 8
minibatch replays. Moreover, in order to prevent convergence to a constant classifier on SVHN, we
linearly increase the perturbation radius from 0 to ε during the first 5 epochs for all methods.
For PGD-2 AT we use for training a 2-step PGD attack with step size α = ε/2, and for PGD-10
AT we use for training a 10-step PGD attack with α = 2ε/10.
For Fig. 1 and Fig. 8 we used the GradAlign λ values obtained via a linear interpolation on the
logarithmic scale between the best λ values that we found for ε = 8 and ε = 16 on the test sets. We
perform the interpolation on the logarithmic scale since the values of λ are non-negative, a usual linear
interpolation would lead to negative values of λ. The resulting λ values for ε ∈ {1, . . . , 16} are given
in Table 2. We note that at the end we do not report the results with ε > 12 for SVHN since many
models have trivial robustness close to that of a constant classifier. For the PGD-2 + GradAlign
experiments reported below in Table 4 and Table 5, we use λ = 0.1 for the CIFAR-10 and λ = 0.5
for SVHN experiments.
Training details for the single-layer CNN. The single-layer CNN that we study in Sec. 4
has 4 convolutional filters, each of them of size 3×3. After the convolution we apply ReLU activation,
and then we directly have a fully-connected layer, i.e. we do not use any pooling layer. For training
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Table 2: GradAlign λ values used for the experiments on CIFAR-10 and SVHN. These values are obtained
via a linear interpolation on the logarithmic scale between successful λ values at ε = 8 and ε = 16.
ε (/255) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
λCIFAR−10 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.27 0.36 0.47 0.63 0.84 1.12 1.50 2.00
λSV HN 1.66 1.76 1.86 1.98 2.10 2.22 2.36 2.50 2.65 2.81 2.98 3.16 3.35 3.56 3.77 4.00
a.) Standard model b.) PGD-trained model
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Figure 10: The quality of the linear approximation of `(x+ δ) for δ with different `2-norm for ‖δ‖∞ fixed
to ε for a standard and PGD-trained ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10.
we use the ADAM optimizer with learning rate 0.003 for 30 epochs using the same cyclical learning
rate schedule.
ImageNet experiments. We use ResNet-50 following the training scheme of [46] which includes
3 training stages on different image resolution. For GradAlign, we slightly reduce the batch size
on the second and third stages from 224 and 128 to 180 and 100 respectively in order to reduce
the memory consumption. For all ε ∈ {2, 4, 6}, we train FGSM models with GradAlign using
λ ∈ {0.01, 0.1}. The final λ we report are λ ∈ {0.01, 0.01, 0.1} for ε ∈ {2, 4, 6} respectively.
Computing infrastructure. We perform all our experiments on NVIDIA V100 GPUs with
32GB of memory.
C Supporting experiments and visualizations for Sec. 3 and Sec. 4
We describe here supporting experiments and visualizations related to Sec. 3 and Sec. 4.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Epoch
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
FGSM AT: FGSM acc.
FGSM AT: PGD acc.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Epoch
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l l
os
s
FGSM AT: FGSM loss
FGSM AT: PGD loss
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Epoch
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Co
sin
e
FGSM AT: cos( L(x), L(x + ))
FGSM AT: cos( FGSM, PGD)
Figure 11: Visualization of the training process of an FGSM trained CNN with 4 filters with ε = 10/255. We
can observe catastrophic overfitting around epoch 6.
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C.1 Quality of the linear approximation for ReLU networks
For the loss function ` of a ReLU-network, we compute empirically the quality of the linear
approximation defined as
| `(x+ δ)− `(x)− 〈δ,∇x `(x)〉 |,
where the dependency of the loss ` on the label y and parameters θ are omitted for clarity. Then we
perform the following experiment: we take a perturbation δ ∈ {−ε, ε}d, and then zero out different
fractions of its coordinates, which leads to perturbations with a fixed ‖δ‖∞ = ε, but with different
‖δ‖2 ∈ [0,
√
dε]. As the starting δ we choose two types of perturbations: δFGSM generated by FGSM
and δrandom sampled uniformly from the corners of the `∞-ball. We plot the results in Fig. 10 on
CIFAR-10 for ε = 8/255 averaged over 512 test points, and conclude that for both δFGSM and
δrandom the validity of the linear approximation crucially depends on ‖δ‖2 even when ‖δ‖∞ is fixed.
The phenomenon is even more pronounced for FGSM perturbations as the linearization error is
much higher there. Moreover, this observation is consistent across both standardly and adversarially
trained ResNet-18 models.
C.2 Catastrophic overfitting in a single-layer CNN
We describe here complementary figures to Sec. 4 which are related to the single-layer CNN.
Training curves. In Fig. 11, we show the evolution of the FGSM/PGD accuracy, FGSM/PGD
loss, and gradient alignment together with cos(δFGSM , δPGD). We observe that catastrophic over-
fitting occurs around epoch 6 and that its pattern is the same as for the deep ResNet which was
illustrated in Fig. 4. Namely, we see that concurrently the following changes occur around epoch
6: (a) there is a sudden drop of PGD accuracy with an increase in FGSM accuracy, (b) the PGD
loss grows by an order of magnitude while the FGSM loss decreases, (c) both gradient alignment
and cos(δFGSM , δPGD) significantly decrease. Throughout all our experiments we observe a very
high correlation between cos(δFGSM , δPGD) and gradient alignment. This motivates our proposed
regularizer GradAlign which relies on the cosine between ∇x `(x, y; θ) and ∇x `(x+ η, y; θ), where η
is a random point. In this way, we avoid using an iterative procedure inside the regularizer unlike,
for example, the approach of [28].
Additional filters. In Fig. 12, we show the evolution of the regular filter w1 and filter w4 that
leads to catastrophic overfitting for the three input channels (red, green, blue). We can observe
that in the red and green channels, w4 has learned a Laplace filter which is very sensitive to noise.
Moreover, w4 significantly increases in magnitude after catastrophic overfitting contrary to w1 whose
magnitude only decreases (see the colorbar values in Fig. 12 and the plots in Fig. 5).
Additional feature maps. In Fig. 13, we show additional feature maps for images with and
without uniform random noise η ∼ U([−10/255, 10/255]d). These figures complement Fig. 7 shown in
the main part. We clearly see that only the last filter w4 is sensitive to the noise since the feature
maps change dramatically. At the same time, other filters w1, w2, w3 are only slightly affected by
the addition of the noise. We also show the input gradients in the last column which illustrate that
after adding the noise the gradients change drammatically which leads to small gradient alignment
and, in turn, to the failure of FGSM as the solution of the inner maximization problem.
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Figure 12: Evolution of the regular filter w1 and filter w4 that leads to catastrophic overfitting. We plot
red (R), green (G), and blue (B) channels of the filters. We can observe that in R and G channels, w4 has
learned a Laplace filter which is very sensitive to noise.
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Figure 13: Input images, feature maps, and gradients of the single-layer CNN trained on CIFAR-10 at the
end of training (after catastrophic overfitting). Odd row : original images. Even row : original image plus
random noise U([−10/255, 10/255]d). We observe that only the last filter w4 is highly sensitive to the small
uniform noise since the feature maps change dramatically.
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D Additional experiments for different adversarial training schemes
In this section, we describe additional experiments related to GradAlign that complement the results
shown in Sec. 5.
D.1 Stronger PGD-2 baseline
As mentioned in Sec. 5, the PGD-2 training baseline that we report outperforms other similar
baselines reported in the literature [48, 28]. Here we elaborate what are likely to be the most
important sources of difference. First, we follow the cyclical learning rate schedule of [46] which can
work as implicit early stopping and thus can help to prevent catastrophic overfitting observed for
PGD-2 in [28]. Another source of difference is that [28] use the ADAM optimizer while we stick to
the standard PGD updates using the sign of the gradient [23].
The second important factor is a proper step size selection. While [48] do not observe catastrophic
overfitting, their PGD-3 baseline achieves only 32.51% adversarial accuracy compared to the 48.43%
for our PGD-2 baseline evaluated with a stronger attack (PGD-50-10 instead of PGD-20-1). One
potential explanation for this difference lies in the step size selection, where for PGD-2 we use α = ε/2.
Related to the step size selection, we also found that using random initialization in PGD (we will
refer to as PGD-k-RS) as suggested in [23] requires a larger step size α. We show the results in
Table 3 where we can see that PGD-2-RS AT with α = ε/2 achieves suboptimal robustness compared
to α = ε used for training. However, we consistently observed that PGD-2 AT with α = ε/2 and no
random step performs best. Thus, we use the latter as our PGD-2 baseline throughout the paper,
thus always starting PGD-2 from the original point, without using any random step.
Table 3: Robustness of different PGD-2 schemes for ε = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 for ResNet-18. The results are
averaged over 5 random seeds used for training.
Model PGD-2-RS AT, α = ε/2 PGD-2-RS AT, α = ε PGD-2 AT, α = ε/2
PGD-50-10 accuracy 45.06±0.44% 48.07±0.52% 48.43±0.40%
D.2 Results with early stopping
We complement the results presented in Fig. 8 without early stopping with the results with early
stopping which we show in Fig. 14. For CIFAR-10, we observe that FGSM+GradAlign leads to a
good robustness and accuracy outperforming FGSM AT and FGSM-RS AT and performing similarly
to PGD-2 and slightly improving for larger ε close to 16/255. For SVHN, GradAlign leads to better
robustness than other FGSM-based methods. We also observe that for large ε on both CIFAR-10
and SVHN, AT for Free performs similarly to FGSM-based methods. Moreover, for ε ≥ 10/255 on
SVHN, AT for Free converges to a constant classifier.
On both CIFAR-10 and SVHN, we can see that although early stopping can lead to non-trivial
robustness, standard accuracy is often significantly sacrificed which limits the usefulness of this
technique. This is in contrast to training with GradAlign which leads to the same standard accuracy
as PGD-10 training.
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Figure 14: Accuracy (dashed line) and robustness (solid line) of different adversarial training (AT) methods
on CIFAR-10 and SVHN with ResNet-18 trained and evaluated with different l∞-radii. The results are
obtained with early stopping, averaged over 5 random seeds used for training and reported with the
standard deviation.
D.3 Results for specific `∞-radii
Here we report results from Fig. 8 for specific `∞-radii which are most often studied in the literature.
CIFAR-10 results. We report robustness and accuracy in Table 4 for CIFAR-10 without using
early stopping where we can clearly see which methods lead to catastrophic overfitting and thus
suboptimal robustness. We compare the same methods as in Fig. 8, and additionally we report the
results for ε = 8/255 of the CURE [25], YOPO [48], and LLR [28] approaches. First, for ε = 8/255,
we see that FGSM + GradAlign outperforms AT for Free and all methods that use FGSM training.
Then, we also observe that the model trained with CURE [25] leads to robustness that is suboptimal
compared to FGSM-RS AT evaluated with a stronger attack: 36.3% vs 45.1%. YOPO-3-5 and
YOPO-5-3 [48] require 3 and 5 full steps of PGD respectively, thus they are much more expensive
than FGSM-RS AT, and, however, they lead to worse adversarial accuracy: 38.18% and 44.72% vs
45.10%. [28] report that LLR-2, i.e. their approach with 2 steps of PGD, achieves 44.50% adversarial
accuracy. This result is not directly comparable to other results in Table 4 since [28] use (1) a larger
network (Wide-ResNet-28-8), and (2) a stronger attack (MultiTargeted [13]). However, we think
that the gap of 3− 4% compared to the adversarial accuracy of our reported FGSM + GradAlign
and PGD-2 methods (47.58% and 48.43% resp.) is still significant since the difference between
MultiTargeted and a PGD attack with random restarts is observed to be small (e.g. around 1%
between MultiTargeted and PGD-20-10 on the CIFAR-10 challenge of [23]).
For ε = 16/255, none of the one-step methods work without early stopping except FGSM+ GradAlign.
We also evaluate PGD-2 + GradAlign and conclude that the benefit of combining the two comes
when PGD-2 alone leads to catastrophic overfitting which occurs at ε = 16/255. For ε = 8/255, there
is no benefit of combining the two approaches. This is consistent with our observation regarding
catastrophic overfitting for FGSM (e.g. see Fig. 8 for small ε): if there is no catastrophic overfitting,
there is no benefit of adding GradAlign to FGSM training.
To further ensure that FGSM+GradAlign models do not benefit from gradient masking [27],
we additionally compare the robustness of FGSM+GradAlign and FGSM-RS models obtained via
AutoAttack [8]. We observe that AutoAttack proportionally reduces the adversarial accuracy of
both models: for ε = 8/255, FGSM+GradAlign achieves 44.54±0.24% adversarial accuracy while
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Table 4: Robustness and accuracy of different robust training methods on CIFAR-10. We report results
without early stopping for ResNet-18 unless specified otherwise in parentheses. The results of all the methods
reported in Fig. 8 are shown here with the standard deviation and averaged over 5 random seeds used for
training.
Model Accuracy Attack
Standard Adversarial
ε = 8/255
Standard 94.03% 0.00% PGD-50-10
CURE [25] 81.20% 36.30% PGD-20-1
YOPO-3-5 [48] 82.14% 38.18% PGD-20-1
YOPO-5-3 [48] 83.99% 44.72% PGD-20-1
LLR-2 (Wide-ResNet-28-8) [28] 90.46% 44.50% MultiTargeted [28]
FGSM 85.16±1.3% 0.02±0.04% PGD-50-10
FGSM-RS 84.32±0.08% 45.10±0.56% PGD-50-10
FGSM + GradAlign 81.00±0.37% 47.58±0.24% PGD-50-10
AT for Free (m = 8) 77.92±0.65% 45.90±0.98% PGD-50-10
PGD-2 (α = 4/255) 82.15±0.48% 48.43±0.40% PGD-50-10
PGD-2 (α = 4/255) + GradAlign 81.16±0.39% 47.76±0.77% PGD-50-10
PGD-10 (α = 2ε/10) 81.88±0.37% 50.04±0.79% PGD-50-10
ε = 16/255
FGSM 73.76±7.4% 0.00±0.00% PGD-50-10
FGSM-RS 72.18±3.7% 0.00±0.00% PGD-50-10
FGSM + GradAlign 58.46±0.22% 28.88±0.70% PGD-50-10
AT for Free (m = 8) 48.10±9.83% 0.00±0.00% PGD-50-10
PGD-2 (α = ε/2) 68.65±5.83% 9.92±14.00% PGD-50-10
PGD-2 (α = ε/2) + GradAlign 61.38±0.71% 29.80±0.42% PGD-50-10
PGD-10 (α = 2ε/10) 60.28±0.50% 33.24±0.52% PGD-50-10
FGSM-RS achieves 42.80±0.58%. This is consistent with the evaluation results of [8] where they show
that AutoAttack reduces adversarial accuracy for many models by 2%-3% for ε = 8/255 compared to
the originally reported results based on the standard PGD attack (see Table 2 in [8]). The same
tendency is observed also for higher ε, e.g. for ε = 16/255 FGSM+GradAlign achieves 20.56±0.36%
adversarial accuracy when evaluated with AutoAttack.
SVHN results. We report robustness and accuracy in Table 5 for SVHN without using
early stopping. We can see that for both ε = 8/255 and ε = 16/255, GradAlign successfully prevents
catastrophic overfitting in contrast to FGSM and FGSM-RS, although there is still a 5% gap to
PGD-2 training for ε = 8/255. AT for free performs slightly better than FGSM+GradAlign for
ε = 8/255, but it already starts to show a high variance in the robustness and accuracy depending on
the random seed. For ε = 12/255, all the 5 models of AT for free converge to a constant classifier.
Combining PGD-2 with GradAlign does not lead to improved results for ε = 8/255 since there
is no catastrophic overfitting for PGD-2. However, for ε = 12/255, we can clearly see that PGD-
2 + GradAlign leads to better results than PGD-2 achieving 31.26±0.24% instead of 14.30±13.34%
adversarial accuracy.
ImageNet results. We also perform similar experiments on ImageNet in Table 6. We observe
that even for standard FGSM training, catastrophic overfitting does not occur for ε ∈ {2/255, 4/255}
considered in [34, 46], and thus there is no additional benefit from using GradAlign since its main role
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Table 5: Robustness and accuracy of different robust training methods on SVHN. We report results without
early stopping for ResNet-18. All the results are reported with the standard deviation and averaged over 5
random seeds used for training.
Model Accuracy
Standard PGD-50-10
ε = 8/255
Standard 96.00% 1.00%
FGSM 91.40±1.64% 0.04±0.05%
FGSM-RS 95.38±0.27% 0.00±0.00%
FGSM + GradAlign 92.36±0.47% 42.08±0.25%
AT for Free (m = 8) 75.34±28.4% 43.16±12.3%
PGD-2 (α = ε/2) 92.68±0.45% 47.28±0.26%
PGD-2 + GradAlign (α = ε/2) 92.46±0.35% 47.02±0.83%
PGD-10 (α = 2ε/10) 91.92±0.40% 52.08±0.49%
ε = 12/255
FGSM 88.74±1.25% 0.00±0.00%
FGSM-RS 94.70±0.66% 0.00±0.00%
FGSM + GradAlign 88.54±0.21% 24.04±0.31%
AT for Free (m = 8) 18.50±0.00% 18.50±0.00%
PGD-2 (α = ε/2) 92.74±2.26% 14.30±13.34%
PGD-2 + GradAlign (α = ε/2) 87.14±0.26% 31.26±0.24%
PGD-10 (α = 2ε/10) 84.52±0.63% 38.32±0.38%
Table 6: Robustness and accuracy of different robust training methods on ImageNet. We report results
without early stopping for ResNet-50.
Model `∞-radius Standard accuracy PGD-50-10 accuracy
FGSM 2/255 61.7% 42.1%
FGSM-RS 2/255 59.3% 41.1%
FGSM + GradAlign 2/255 61.8% 41.4%
FGSM 4/255 56.9% 30.6%
FGSM-RS 4/255 55.3% 27.8%
FGSM + GradAlign 4/255 57.8% 30.5%
FGSM 6/255 51.5% 20.6%
FGSM-RS 6/255 36.6% 0.1%
FGSM + GradAlign 6/255 51.5% 20.3%
is to prevent catastrophic overfitting. We report the results of FGSM+GradAlign for completeness
to show that GradAlign can be applied on ImageNet-scale although it leads to approximately 3×
slowdown on ImageNet. We find that the exact slowdown of GradAlign depends on the GPU
utilization and the batch size ranging from from 2× to 3× on different datasets.
For ε = 6/255, we observe that catastrophic overfitting occurs for FGSM-RS very early in training
(around epoch 3), but not for FGSM or FGSM + GradAlign. This contradicts our observations on
CIFAR-10 and SVHN where we observed that FGSM-RS usually helps to postpone catastrophic
overfitting to higher ε. However, it is computationally demanding to replicate the results on ImageNet
multiple times over different random seeds as we did for CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Thus, we leave a
more detailed investigation of catastrophic overfitting on ImageNet for future work.
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D.4 Ablation studies
In this section, we aim to provide more details about sensitivity of GradAlign to its hyperparameter
λ, the total number of training epochs, and also discuss training with GradAlign for very high ε
values.
Ablation study for GradAlign λ. We provide an ablation study for the regularization
parameter λ of GradAlign in Fig. 15, where we plot the adversarial accuracy of ResNet-18 trained
using FGSM + GradAlign with ε = 16/255 on CIFAR-10. First, we observe that for small λ
catastrophic overfitting occurs so that the average PGD-50-10 accuracy is either 0% or greater than
0% but has a high standard deviation since only some runs are successful while other runs fail
because of catastrophic overfitting. We observe that the best performance is achieved for λ = 2
where catastrophic overfitting does not occur and the final adversarial accuracy is very concentrated.
For larger λ values we observe a slow decrease in the adversarial accuracy since the model becomes
overregularized. We note that the range of λ values which have close to the best performance (≥ 26%
adversarial accuracy) ranges in [0.25, 4], thus we conclude that GradAlign is robust to the exact
choice of λ. This is also confirmed by our hyperparameter selection method for Fig. 8, where we
performed a linear interpolation on the logarithmic scale between successful λ values for ε = 8/255
and ε = 16/255. Even such a coarse hyperparameter selection method, could ensure that none of the
FGSM + GradAlign runs reported in Fig. 15 suffered from catastrophic overfitting.
Ablation study for the total number of training epochs. Recently, Rice et al. [30] brought
up the importance of early stopping in adversarial training. They identify the phenomenon called
robust overfitting when training longer hurts the adversarial accuracy on the test set. Thus, we check
here whether training with GradAlign has some influence on robust overfitting. We note that the
authors of [30] suggest that robust and catastrophic overfitting phenomena are distinct since robust
overfitting implies a gap between training and test set robustness, while catastrophic overfitting
implies low robustness on both training and test sets. To explore this for FGSM + GradAlign, in
Fig. 16 we show the final clean and adversarial accuracies for five different models trained with
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Figure 15: Ablation study for the regularization
parameter λ for FGSM + GradAlign under ε =
16/255 without early stopping. We train ResNet-18
models on CIFAR-10. The results are averaged over
3 random seeds used for training and reported with
the standard deviation.
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Figure 16: Ablation study for the total number
of training epochs for FGSM + GradAlign under
ε = 8/255 without early stopping. We train ResNet-
18 models on CIFAR-10. The results are averaged
over 3 random seeds used for training and reported
with the standard deviation.
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{30, 50, 100, 150, 250} epochs. We observe the same trend as [30] report: training longer slightly
degrades adversarial accuracy while the clean accuracy slightly improves. Thus, this experiment also
suggests that robust overfitting is not directly connected to catastrophic overfitting and has to be
addressed separately. Finally, we note based on Fig. 16 that when we use FGSM in combination
with GradAlign, even training up to 200 epochs does not lead to catastrophic overfitting.
Ablation study for very high ε. Here we make an additional test on whether GradAlign
prevents catastrophic overfitting for very high ε values. In Fig. 8 and Fig. 14 we showed results
for ε ≤ 16 for CIFAR-10 and for ε ≤ 12 on SVHN. For SVHN, FGSM + GradAlign achieves
24.04±0.31% adversarial accuracy which is already close to that of a majority classifier (18.50%).
The effect of increasing the perturbations size ε on SVHN even further just leads to learning a
constant classifier. However, on CIFAR-10 for ε = 16, FGSM + GradAlign achieves 28.88±0.70%
adversarial accuracy which is sufficiently far from that of a majority classifier (10.00%). Thus, a
natural question is whether catastrophic overfitting still occurs for GradAlign on CIFAR-10, but just
for higher ε values than what we considered in the main part of the paper. To show that it is not the
case, in Table 7 we show the results of FGSM + GradAlign trained with ε ∈ {24/255, 32/255} (we use
λ = 2.0 and the maximum learning rate 0.1). We observe no signs of catastrophic overfitting even for
very high ε such as 32/255. Note that in this case the standard accuracy is very low (23.07±3.35%),
thus considering such large perturbations is not practically interesting, but it rather serves as a
sanity check that our method does not suffer from catastrophic overfitting even for very high ε.
Table 7: Robustness and accuracy of FGSM + GradAlign for very high ε on CIFAR-10 without early
stopping for ResNet-18. We report results with the standard deviation and averaged over 3 random seeds
used for training. We observe no catastrophic overfitting even for very high ε.
`∞-radius Standard accuracy PGD-50-10 accuracy
24/255 41.80±0.36% 17.07±0.90%
32/255 23.07±3.35% 12.93±1.44%
D.5 Comparison of GradAlign to gradient-based penalties
In this section, we compare GradAlign to other alternatives: `2 gradient norm penalization and
CURE [25]. The motivation to study them comes from the fact that after catastrophic overfitting,
the input gradients change dramatically inside the `∞-balls around input points, and thus other
gradient-based regularizers may also be able to improve the stability of the input gradients and thus
prevent catastrophic overfitting.
In Table 8, we present results of FGSM training with other gradient-based penalties studied in
the literature:
• `2 gradient norm regularization [31, 36]: λ ‖∇x`(x, y; θ)‖22,
• curvature regularization (CURE) [25]: λ ‖∇x`(x+ δFGSM , y; θ)−∇x`(x, y; θ)‖22.
First of all, we note that the originally proposed approaches [31, 36, 25] do not involve adversarial
training and rely only on these gradient penalties to achieve some degree of robustness. In contrast,
we combine the gradient penalties with FGSM training to see whether they can prevent catastrophic
overfitting similarly to GradAlign. For the gradient norm penalty, we use the regularization
parameters λ ∈ {1,000, 2,000} for ε ∈ {8/255, 16/255} respectively. For CURE, we use λ ∈ {700, 20,000}
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Table 8: Additional comparison of FGSM AT with GradAlign to FGSM AT with other gradient penalties
on CIFAR-10. We report results without early stopping for ResNet-18. All the results are reported with the
standard deviation and averaged over 5 random seeds used for training.
Model Accuracy
Standard PGD-50-10
ε = 8/255
FGSM + ‖∇x‖22 77.47±0.14% 46.69±1.27%
FGSM + CURE 80.20±0.29% 47.25±0.21%
FGSM + GradAlign 81.00±0.37% 47.58±0.24%
ε = 16/255
FGSM + ‖∇x‖22 56.44±2.22% 13.64±11.2%
FGSM + CURE 62.39±0.42% 25.38±0.29%
FGSM + GradAlign 58.46±0.22% 28.88±0.70%
for ε ∈ {8/255, 16/255} respectively. In both cases, we found the optimal hyperparameters using a grid
search over λ. We can see that for ε = 8/255 all three approaches successfully prevent catastrophic
overfitting, although the final robustness slightly varies between 46.69% for FGSM with the `2-gradient
penalty and 47.58% for FGSM with GradAlign.
For ε = 16/255, both FGSM + CURE and FGSM + GradAlign prevent catastrophic overfitting
leading to very concentrated results with a small standard deviation (0.29% and 0.70% respectively).
However, the average adversarial accuracy is better for FGSM + GradAlign: 28.88% vs 25.38%.
At the same time, FGSM with the `2-gradient penalty leads to unstable final performance: the
adversarial accuracy has a high standard deviation: 13.64± 11.2%.
We think that the main difference in the performance of GradAlign compared to the gradient
penalties that we considered comes from the fact that it is invariant to the gradient norm, and it
takes into account only the directions of two gradients inside the `∞-ball around the given input.
Inspired by CURE, we also tried two additional experiments:
1. Using the FGSM point δFGSM for the gradient taken at the second input point for GradAlign,
but we observed that it does not make a substantial difference, i.e. this version of GradAlign
also prevents catastrophic overfitting and leads to similar results. However, if we use CURE
without FGSM in the cross-entropy loss, then we observe a benefit of using δFGSM in the
regularizer which is consistent with the observations made in Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25].
2. Using GradAlign without FGSM in the cross-entropy loss. In this case, we observed that the
model did not significantly improve its robustness suggesting that GradAlign is not a sufficient
regularizer on its own to promote robustness and has to be used with some adversarial training
method.
We think that an interesting future direction is to explore how one can speed up GradAlign or
to come up with other regularization methods that are also able to prevent catastrophic overfitting,
but avoid relying on the input gradients which lead to a slowdown in training. We think that some
potential strategies to speed up GradAlign can include parallelization of the computations or saving
some computations by subsampling the training batches for the regularizer. We postpone a further
exploration of these ideas to future work.
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